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Abstract 
Present study explored leverage-performance relation while the moderating firm size in developing countries 
like Pakistan. Data is collected for 304 Pakistani non-financial firms for the period of 2005-2013. It is found 
that overall leverage-performance relation is negative for all types of firms. However, such losses are more 
prominent for small size firms. Results also showed that the leverage-performance relation is nonlinear for 
medium and large size firms.However, in practice these firms are not targeting optimal level and over-leveraging 
that ultimately decrease their profits.So, financial managers of small size firms should avoid debt financing 
while for large and medium size firms,managers need to adjust their debt ratio toits optimal level. 
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1. Introduction 
Capital structure is one of most studied areas of corporate finance from last few decades (Gama & Galvão, 2012; 
Stretcher & Johnson, 2011). Despite the abundant literature of capital structure, researchers are failed to consent 
to a single generalized theory. Though, Modigliani & Miller, (1958) proposed irrelevancy theory and argued that 
firm value is not affected by capital structure decisions but the theory is only applicable within perfect market 
conditions those are not subsisted in real world. Myers, (1984)argued that in the absence of perfect market 
conditions, capital structure become more relevant. Consequently, following irrelevancy theory, various theories 
are devised to explain leverage-performance relation in real world practices.  
However, authors documented different results and explained variousrationales in this respect. Some 
authors found positive leverage-performance relation while others believe conversely and described debt as 
negative connotation (Abor, 2010). Even some studies found insignificant or inconsistent results in this 
respect(Fama & French, 1998; Lemmon & Zender, 2001). It is argued that reason behind such contradictory and 
inconsistent results is contingency and situational factors (Jermias, 2008). O’Brien, (2003) also argued that 
studying direct leverage-performance relationship could portray misleading conclusions due to situational and 
contingency factors. Magnitude and even direction of leverage-performance relation can change due to these 
factors. Therefore, it is important to consider moderating factors while studying leverage-performance relation.  
Previously, most of the studies explored direct leverage-performance relation while few articles 
considered moderating factors in this context. For instance, Jermias, (2008) and O’Brien, (2003) studied firm 
strategy and competitiveness, Simerly & Li, (2000) explored environment dynamism and  McConnell & Servaes, 
(1995) argued to the growth opportunities as potential moderators to the leverage-performance relation. However, 
one of the firm specific less researched areas that can also moderate the leverage-performance relation is the firm 
size.  Firm size is viewed as significant factor that can affect the firm’s relation withits external environment 
(Ezeoha, 2008). Since, larger firms have more capacity to influence their stakeholders, their role is more critical 
in corporate environment. Similarly, these firms play significant role in commercializing innovative ideas provided 
by small firms. From macroeconomic perspective much part of economic growth came from the growth of large 
size concerns. So, with its increasing recognition to external business environment firm size can be an important 
ingredient to corporate finance decisions (Voulgaris, Asteriou, & Agiomirgianakis, 2004).  
If these arguments are true then capital structure decisions and their consequences can also be affected by 
firm size especially in developing countries where environment is found more dynamic.Dynamic environment can 
variably affect the competitiveness of large and small firms that affects their capital structure decisions. The 
purpose of this research is also to investigate the leverage-performance relationship within contingency factor of 
firm size for Pakistani non-financial firms. In Pakistan, existing literature is vacant from study of leverage-
performance relation in moderation of firm size. Though, some authors have studied firm size as moderator to the 
capital structure decisions in other contexts (González & González, 2012; Ozenbas & Portes, 2011; Voulgaris et 
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al., 2004). However, these studies mainly focused on determinants of debt borrowings while no attention is given 
to study moderating role of firm size to leverage-performance relation. This research fills this literature gap and 
investigates leverage-performance relation for small, medium and large size firms in case of Pakistani non-
financial firms listed at Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE).  
 
2. Theoretical Background: 
2.1 Capital Structure Theories: 
Originally, it was Modigliani & Miller, (1958) who first started the debate of leverage-performance relation. They 
argued that under efficient market hypothesis such as neutral tax, no agency cost, symmetric information and no 
transaction cost,the firm value is irrelevant of its capital structure. However, the implication of irrelevancy theory 
is questioned due to the non-existence of efficient market in real world (Harris & Raviv, 1991). So, after their 
work various authors established the rationales for the implication of leverage-performance relation in the absence 
of efficient market. Trade off theory, pecking order theory and agency theory are three most prominent relevancy 
theories those in this respect.  
According to Trade off theory, benefits and costs are associated with debt and firms should follow a 
targeted debt ratio where benefits are maximum against minimum loss (Graham, 2000; Kim & Sorensen, 1986). 
Key benefit of debt borrowings is tax advantages. Conversely, increased debt levelaugments the chance of default 
and the cost of financial distress. Such costs are segregated into two categories of direct cost of financial distress 
and indirect cost of financial distress. However, firms can maximize their value to follow optimal debt ratio where 
its benefits are maximum with minimum cost (Kim & Sorensen, 1986). 
Similarly, agency theory articulates debt borrowings as positive connotation in term of controlling 
mechanism of agency problems (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Managers are the agent of their shareholders and they 
should work in the best interest of their principal. However, conflict can arise between the objectives of managers 
and their shareholders especially in case of free cash flows (Jensen, 1986). It is argued that managers can use free 
cash flows for their personal benefits while deploying more debt can enforce them to invest such free cash flows 
to positive NPV projects to meet new-fangled obligations. Moreover, creditors also impose debt covenants that 
restrict managers to use these cash flows for their personal benefits. This implies that debt borrowings can act as 
monitoring mechanism and increase managerial performances.  
Conversely, Pecking order theory postulates negative leverage-performance relationship. The theory 
argued that firms prefer their internal funds over debt and equity while financing their operations (Myers & Majluf, 
1984). Pecking order theory suggests that firms follow hierarchy of financing options that start from retain earnings 
to external debts to equity. Since, asymmetric information prevails in the market so pecking order theory believes 
that investors will under-price newly issued shares. To avoid such losses managers consider equity financing as a 
last resort. Thus, profitable firms prefer theirinternal funds to finance their operations that lead to negative 
leverage-performance relation.  
However, it is argued that these traditional capital structure theories do not endow with sufficient 
explanation of capital structure for small, medium or large firms (Ezeoha, 2008). Implication of these theories can 
vary within these categories of firm size because small and large firms contain different characteristics which can 
direct to different financial decisions (Voulgaris et al., 2004). Subsequent part will explore that how these 
categories of firm size differ from each other and affect capital structure decisions. 
 
2.2 Firm Size and Capital Structure: 
Previous literature has explored various differentiating factors between large and small size firms. The most 
prominent distinguishing factors are level of profits and their volatility (González & González, 2012). It is argued 
that larger firms generate high and less volatile profits while small firms do conversely. Similarly, small firms also 
document low liquidity as compared to large firms. This indicates that small firms can be more risky due to low 
liquidity and volatile profits as compared to larger firms. Moreover, larger firms also hold more fixed tangible 
assets as compared to the small firms. Such characteristics make it easier for larger firms to access debt markets 
without difficulty. So, it is mush possible that large firms deploy more debts as compared to small firms.  
However, important thing is that what will be the value of large and small firms if they deploy more debt. 
The purpose of this research is to investigate such role of firm size to the leverage-performance relation. Previously, 
moderating effects of firm size to leverage-performance relation is found to be ignored. Though, one can find 
studies investigating leverage-performance relation for SMEs without comparing with large firms. For instance 
Abor, (2010) studied leverage-performance relation for SMEs from Ghana and South Africa and found that in 
general debt and especially long term debts are negatively associated with firm profitability. On the contrary Jaggi 
& Gul, (1999) studied moderating effects of size to the relationship between investment opportunities, free cash 
flow and debt borrowing. Their results revealed that there is a positive relation between debt and free cash flows 
for low investment opportunity set firms when firm size is high. They found that size is a significant moderator to 
the relation between investment opportunities, free cash flow and performance.  
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González & González, (2012) andVoulgariset al.,(2004) explored determinants of capital structure to the 
contingency of firm size but did not consider it with respect to leverage-performance relation. This research 
proposed that leverage-performance relation can vary within different firm size. Since, larger firms generate high 
and less volatile profits with strong liquidity so their risk premium will also be lower comparatively. Similarly, 
information is less asymmetric in case of larger firms that also decrease their uncertainty level. Moreover, larger 
firms also hold high tangible assets that they can use as collateral while borrowing external debt. Consequently, 
these larger firms access the debt market easily at lower cost to gain tax advantages. So, in accordance with the 
trade-off theory, one can anticipate positive leverage-performance relation for large size firms. Agency theory also 
describes such positive leverage-performance relationship for large firms. Since, large firms generate more profits 
and hold high free cash flows that managers could use for their own benefits. So, to avoid such agency issue debt 
borrowings can act as monitoring mechanism and enforce managers for better performances. Hence, the first 
hypothesis of this research will be as follows. 
H1: There is positive relation between debt ratio and firm profitability for larger firms. 
On the contrary small firms contain low liquidity and low profits with more volatility that increases their risk 
premium. It is argued that small firms show more exposure to market dynamism that increases their idiosyncratic 
risk and ultimately excess returns comparatively. This argument can be more prominent in the case of developing 
countries where the environment is found more volatile. So, in Pakistan one can also predict high risk premium 
for small firms that increase their cost of debt. Moreover, information is also more asymmetric for small firms that 
also make difficult for them to access the debt market at lower cost. So, it is much possible that small firms could 
not get surpass tax benefits against the high cost of debt. Hence, a second hypothesis of this research will be as 
follows. 
H2:There is negative relation between debt ratio and firm profitability for small firms. 
 
3. Methodology: 
3.1 Data and Sample: 
To conclude the proposed theory, 304 non-financial firms listed at KSE are selected for the period of 2005 to 2013. 
Selected panel data include 2557 number of observations and collected from annual publications of balance sheet 
analysis of non-financial firms published by State Bank of Pakistan. However, this selection of the sample is made 
after excluding financial firms, default firms, firms who reported negative equity and firm’s observations showed 
zero sales. Financial sector is excluded because they have difference characteristics especially with respect to their 
operations. Default firms are also excluded because these firms normally show continuous deteriorating 
performances due to financial distress. Their inclusion can affect the comparative analysis of debt financing on 
firm performances. Reason to exclude negative equity observations is due to accumulated losses more than share 
capital that could mislead the results. Moreover, with zero sales, no activity is performed thatshows no valueto 
their performances and should not be the part of analysis. 
 
3.2 Model: 
To assess the moderating effects of firm size on the leverage-performance relation following fixed effect model is 
employed. Table 1 shows the detail of variables used in the proposed model. The dependent variable is return on 
assets (ROA) while independent variables include the debt ratio (DR) and its cross effects with small and large 
firm size. Since, medium firm size is taken as the reference category, so it’s cross effect is not included. Firms are 
categorized as small, medium and large on the basis of natural log of their sales (ln(Sales)). Firms whose values 
lie within first quartile of ln(Sales) are considered as small firms. Similarly, firms who lie in fourth quartile are 
labelled as large firms while remaining second and third quartile are considered as medium size firm. This 
methodology is consistent with (González & González, 2012) who also categorized firms on the basis of quartiles 
of ln(sales).  
ROAit =  + 1DRit + 2DRit*Small + 3DRit*Large + 4STTAit + 5CRit + 6RecTAit + t + 	i	 + 	εit 
Proposed model also includes three control variables of STTA (sales to total assets), CR (current ratio) and RecTA 
(receivables to total assets). Ut and Vi represent the unobserved variations due to firm variants and time specific 
dummy factors. STATA is used to execute proposed models. To check the reliability of results various diagnostics 
as proposed by Torres-Reyna, (2007) are also employed. It is notable that coefficient of DR (1) will represent 
the slope of debt ratio for the reference category of medium firms. However, for small and large firms this slope 
of DR will become (1+ 2) and (1+ 3) respectively. Here 2 and 3 will show marginal effects of debt 
when a firm is small and large respectively as compared to medium size firms. These marginal effects and their 
slopes will explore that debt financing is optimal decision for small, medium and large firms or not. Consequently, 
hypotheses of this research could also be testified. 
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Table 1: Definition of Variables 
DependentVariable ROA Return on Assets EBIT / Total Assets 
Independent Variable DR Debt Ratio Total Liabilities / Total Assets 
Moderating Variables 
Small 
Small Size Firm 
Dummy 
Equals to 1 if ln(Sales) lies in first quartile 
and 0 otherwise 
Large 
Large Size Firm 
Dummy 
Equals to 1 if ln(sales) lies in fourth 
quartile and 0 otherwise 
 
Control Variables 
STTA Sales to total assets Total Sales / Total Assets 
CR Current Ratio Current Assets / Current Liabilities 
RecTA 
Receivable to Total 
Assets 
Total Receivables / Total Assets 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive Analysis: 
Descriptive statistics for the sampled data are presented in Table 2. Data is categorized on the basis of small, 
medium and large size firms. Descriptive analysis is showing that low size firms earned low profitability of only 
3.9% average return on assets (ROA) as compared to 10.4% and 14.1% return on assets of medium and large size 
firms respectively. Moreover, standard deviation (SD) of ROA for small firms is also showing high variations of 
14% even with lower average returns. Thus, it can be concluded that comparatively small firms contain less profits 
with more variation that is consistent with prior discussion. However, not much difference is found between 
average debt ratio (DR) of small and large firms, but with more variations for small firms.  
Results also show usage of high short term debt (STDR, calculated as the ratio of current liabilities to 
total assets) regardless the type of firm. One of the reasons behind such over reliance on current liabilities can be 
attributed to the inefficiencies of capital markets in Pakistan. Capital markets especially bond markets are not 
developed in Pakistan that confined the financing options to short term instruments generally (Raza, Aslam, & 
Farooq, 2013). The results also revealed that small firms documented better liquidity (1.560) as compared to 
medium (1.327) and even large firms (1.494). This can be due to more investment in current assets by small firms 
as a short term debt ratio for both the categories does not differ significantly. STTA for small firms also showed 
low statistics and indicates that more investment in working capital is not utilized optimally. Hence, it can be 
concluded that Small firms contain low and volatile profits, better liquidity and low asset efficiencies as compared 
to large firms in case of Pakistani non-financial firms. 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
    ROA DR STDR STTA CR RecTA 
Mean 
Small 0.039 0.555 0.409 1.073 1.560 0.096 
Medium 0.104 0.593 0.423 1.253 1.327 0.095 
Large 0.141 0.560 0.416 1.450 1.494 0.110 
SD 
Small 0.140 0.237 0.215 1.928 1.867 0.123 
Medium 0.097 0.191 0.168 0.688 1.062 0.094 
Large 0.124 0.191 0.189 1.041 1.013 0.130 
Max 
Small 1.772 0.996 0.959 21.062 14.600 1.183 
Medium 0.604 1.046 0.956 4.525 9.579 0.565 
Large 0.633 0.999 0.972 7.021 12.229 0.704 
Min 
Small -1.213 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.077 0.000 
Medium -0.553 0.063 0.000 0.118 0.169 0.000 
Large -1.236 0.024 0.024 0.182 0.214 0.000 
Source: Authors’ calculation 
 
4.2 Regression Analysis: 
Table 3 provides the results of the proposed model.Since, the data is panel so it is important to decide that whether 
fixed effect model is appropriate or random effect. We employed hausman test to testify the null hypothesis that 
estimations of both fixed and random effect models are same. Significant value will show that there are substantial 
differences to the coefficients estimated by fixed and random effect models and one should select fixed effect 
model. Table 3 shows that hausman test is significant andconfirms that fixed effect is more appropriate as 
compared to random effect model. We also employed diagnostics test for fixed model as explained by Torres-
Reyna, (2007). To check that whether time dummies are important to include,testparm test is used. Results showed 
that F-value of testparm test is significant and shows that using time dummies to proposed model is more 
appropriate.  
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Since, hausman test is found significant so no need to work with Breusch-Pagan Lagrang Multiplier for 
random effect model. Another important assumption of fixed effect model is cross sectional dependency of 
residuals. However, such cross section dependency assumption is important for macro panel (Torres-Reyna, 2007). 
Panel data used in this research is micro data with less number of years and high numbers of entities. Therefore, 
cross sectional dependency is not critical. However, still we used pasaran CD test but the results are not calculated 
due to few number of years across high number of entities. Similarly, another assumption of serial correlation is 
not critical for micro data (Torres-Reyna, 2007).  
At last we also check the assumption of hetroskedasticityby modified Wald test in STATA. It is found 
that chi2 is highly significant and reject the null hypothesis that variances are constant. This shows that the problem 
of hetroskedasticity prevails and can affect t-values of each variable. However, to control this problem we used 
robust fixed effect model as proposed by (Torres-Reyna, 2007). Similarly, significant Model F-value (44.80) 
concludes that overall model explains significant variations in dependent variable. So, verification of assumptions 
and taking appropriate measures accordingly indicates that results obtained will be reliable. Subsequent part will 
interpret the results obtained from proposed model.  
Results revealed that all the variables except one control variable of current ratio provide significant 
results. Results showed that for medium size firms, one unit change in debt ratio decreases their return on assets 
by 18.7% (or -0.187) on average. However, for small size firms these losses further decrease by 3% (or -0.030). 
Consequently, slope of DR in case of small firms will become -0.217 (-0.187-0.030). Low and volatile earnings 
and more asymmetric information can be the main reason of this negative marginal effect. Ozenbas & Portes, 
(2011) argued that cost of debt is high for smaller firms who are credit constrained due to asymmetric information. 
Voulgaris et al., (2004) also argued that asymmetric information make reluctant the lenders to lend but with high 
cost of debt or with collateral.  
Table 3: Size and Leverage-Performance Relation 
ROA  t-value Sig. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Intercept 0.127*** 3.99 0.000 .0642 0.189 
DR -0.187*** -6.400 0.000 -0.244 -0.129 
DR*Small -0.030** -2.250 0.025 -0.057 -0.004 
DR*Large 0.036*** 2.590 0.010 0.009 0.064 
STTA 0.062*** 5.510 0.000 0.040 0.084 
RecTA 0.067* 1.800 0.072 -0.006 0.141 
CR 0.003 0.530 0.599 -0.007 0.013 
Time Dummy Yes   Hausman 93.68*** 
Industry Dummy Yes   Testparm F 4.22*** 
Adjusted R2 16.4%   Modified Wald 1.0e+36*** 
Model F 21.54***     
*** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10% 
Conversely, marginal effect of large size firms is positive and showed that a unit increase in debt ratio 
increase their profits by 3.6% as compared to the reference category of medium size firms. In this way, the slope 
of DR for large size firms will be -0.151 (-0.187+0.036). The positive marginal effect can be due to better access 
to debt market with less asymmetric information. Thus, in general overall debt financing negatively affects the 
firms’ profits for all three types of firms while such losses are more prominent for small size firms. This negative 
leverage-performance relation can be explained with pecking order theory that argue to the preference of internal 
funds. Similarly, Zeitun & Tian, (2007) provides another argument that in developing countries, companies often 
overleverage themselves to solve agency problems that ultimately decrease their performances. Since, no study till 
date has defined the optimal level of capital structure. This increases the probability that firms do not get optimal 
level to gain its maximum benefits with minimal cost of debt and become overleveraged. This later argument 
appears to be more relevant as agency problem persist in developing countries, especially for larger firms who 
contain high free cash flows. Moreover, the implication of the pecking order theory can also be negated because 
of positive marginal effects of larger firms who contain more internal funds. However, if argument of overleverage 
is accepted then leverage-performance relation will be non-linear where till some level of debt ratio its benefits 
exceeded its cost while after that level cost of debt surpass its benefits. Table 4 provides the results of fixed effect 
model with squares of cross effects of DR with three types of firms as proposed in following model. Since, 
quadratic non-linear leverage-performance relationis expected for small, medium and large firm, their squares are 
used.  
 =  + 1DRit*Small + 2	(DR*Small)2 + 3DR*Med + 4(DR*Med2 + 5DR*Large + 6(DR*Large2
+ 7 STTAit + 8 CRit + 9 RecTAit + t + 	i	 + 	εit 
Results revealed that all cross effects of DR are significant except in case of small firms. Insignificant DR*Small 
accept the null hypothesis that its beta is equal to zero. Conversely, square of cross effect (DR*Small)2 is significant 
Journal of Poverty, Investment and Development                                                                                                                             www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2422-846X     An International Peer-reviewed Journal 
Vol.23, 2016 
 
60 
and negative. Hence, the leverage-performance relation is linear and negative for small firms. It is consistent with 
the second hypothesis proposed in this research. The reasons behind this can be the volatile and low earnings with 
asymmetric information that make debt costly financing option for small size firms as argued earlier. Moreover, 
the implication of the pecking order theory can also be the reason of negative linear relation for small size firms. 
Results from a descriptive analysis indicates better liquidity position, especially in term of current assets for small 
size firms. So, it is much possible that small firms rely on their internal funds rather than external debt.  
Table 4: Nonlinear Leverage-Performance and Size 
  t-value Sig. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Intercept 0.031 1.400 0.161 -0.013 0.075 
DR*Small 0.100 1.350 0.177 -0.045 0.246 
(DR*Small)2 -0.251*** -3.740 0.000 -0.383 -0.120 
DR*Med 0.174** 2.530 0.011 0.039 0.309 
(DR*Med)2 -0.314*** -5.280 0.000 -0.431 -0.198 
DR*Large 0.220*** 2.860 0.004 0.069 0.371 
(DR*Large)2 -0.332*** -4.430 0.000 -0.479 -0.185 
STTA 0.059*** 14.880 0.000 0.051 0.066 
RecTA 0.065** 2.360 0.019 0.011 0.119 
CR 0.009*** 3.490 0.000 0.004 0.014 
Time Dummy Yes     
Industry Dummy Yes     
Adjusted R2 17.65%     
Model F 39.140***     
Hausman 688.880***     
*** Significant at 1%   **   Significant at 5% 
However, the leverage-performance relation is found non-linear for medium and large size firms. Results 
showed that cross effects of DR with medium and large size firms are positive while their squares are negative. 
These results are also significant. This proves that initially leverage-performance relation is positive for medium 
and large size firms, while after a particular debt level it becomes negative. More specifically initially with unit 
increase in DR, ROA of medium and large firms increase by 0.174 and 0.220 respectively. However, after a 
particular debt ratio unit increase in DR decreases the ROA of medium and large firms by -0.314 and -0.332 
respectively. That particular debt level is the optimal debt ratio where profits are maximized.So, the first hypothesis 
is partially accepted as for larger firms leverage-performance relation is found positive but to a particular debt 
level.  
From the process of optimization one can find that optimal debt ratio. Following process shows the step 
inthe optimization process. Taking the derivative of the proposed model with respect to DR following results are 
found. 
ΔROA
ΔDR
= 	1Small + 	2	2DR (Small)2 + 3Med + 2	4DR(Med2 + 5Large + 2	6DR(Large2 
Since, at optimal level f’ (ROA) will be zero, so following equation is extracted for DR where return on assets is 
at its optimal value 
 = 	
−1 Small − 3 Med − 5 Large
2	2 (Small)2 + 2	4(Med2 + 2	6(Large2
 
By using table 4 optimal level for small firms will be 
 = 	
−1 
2	2
=	
0
−0.251
= 0 → %&'()*+	),	&)+%'-	'+.	+*	*/()0'&	&%1%& 
For medium size optimal level will be 
 = 	
−3
2	4
=	
−	0.174
2	(−0.314
= 0.2771	*-	27.71% 
For large firms, optimal level will be 
 = 	
−5
2	6
=	
−	0.220
2	(−0.332
= 0.3313	*-	33.13% 
Thus, for medium size firms their ROA will increase with increase in DR till its value reaches to 0.2771 while 
after this level of DR profits start decreasing. This implies that Pakistani medium size non-financial firms should 
target 0.2771 of debt ratio on average to maximize their value.However, in practice average debt ratio for medium 
size firms is 0.593 as found in table 2 of descriptive statistics.Similarly, for large size firms desired debt ratio is 
0.3313 while in practice their average debt ratio is 0.560 as found in table 2. So, in general large firms are also far 
away from their optimal level. This indicates that on average medium and large firms are over-leveraged that can 
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be the reason of the overall negative relation found in table 3.  
These results also reveal an important implication of the trade-off theory. Results showed that the optimal 
debt ratio for medium firm is 27.71%, while for large firms this ratio is 33.31%. This proves that optimal level of 
DR changes for different types of firms. Therefore, the modified trade-off theory is proposed that targeted optimal 
level under the trade-off theory is not a general value, but could depend on firm specific moderators such as firm 
size.So, this section provides four important implications. 1) Leverage-performance relation is negative and linear 
for small firms 2) Leverage-performance relation is non-linear for medium and large size firms 3) In practice 
medium and larger firms are not following optimal level and over-leveraging that decrease their profits 4) Optimal 
debt ratio is not a generalized value and depend on firm specific moderations. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Present study explored leverage-performance relation while comparing small, medium and large Pakistani non-
financial firms. It is found that debt borrowings by small firms affect their profits most severely while for large 
size firms this adverse effect is found minimum. It is argued that small firms contain more asymmetric information 
with low and volatile returns that make debt borrowings more costly. Conversely, large firms have better access 
to the debt market with less asymmetric information so they deploy debt with less cost comparatively. Results also 
showed that though the marginal effectof large firms is found positive, but still overall slope of debt ratio showed 
negative results. It is argued that firms overleveraged themselves in pursue of optimal level that decrease their 
overall profits. Moreover, a leverage-performance relation is also found nonlinear for medium and large firms, 
while for small firms it is linear and negative. Therefore, debt financing will always affect negatively the value of 
small size firms. However, for medium and large size firms initially it will affect positively to a certain level while 
after that,s their profits start decreasing.Results showed that debt financing increases medium firms’ profits till the 
debt ratio reach to 0.2771 while after this profits start decreasing. Similar results are found in case of large size 
firms, but with optimal level of 0.3313. However, descriptive statistics explored that in real practice medium and 
large size firms showed an average debt ratio of 0.59 and 0.56 respectively. Thus, both large and medium are not 
targeting optimal level and overleveraging themselves. So, the outcome of this study has strong practical 
implications as it will help financial managers in choosing appropriate financing decisions for different types of 
firms in developing countries like Pakistan. Financial managers of small firms should avoid debt borrowings. 
However, in case of medium and large size firms optimal targeted debt ratio should be followed to avoid 
overleveraging problem. 
 
References 
Abor, J. (2010). Debt policy and performance of SMEs Evidence from Ghanaian and South African. The Journal 
of Risk Finance, 8(4), 364–379. doi:10.1108/15265940710777315 
Ezeoha, A. E. (2008). Firm size and corporate financial-leverage choice in a developing economy: Evidence from 
Nigeria. The Journal of Risk Finance, 9(4), 351–364. doi:10.1108/15265940810895016 
Fama, E., & French, K. (1998). Taxes, financing decisions, and firm value. Journal of Finance, 53(2), 819–843. 
Gama, A. P. M., & Galvão, J. M. M. (2012). Performance , valuation and capital structure : survey of family firms. 
Corporate Governance, 12(2), 199–214. doi:10.1108/14720701211214089 
González, V. M., & González, F. (2012). Firm size and capital structure: Evidence using dynamic panel data. 
Applied Economics, 44(36), 4745–4754. doi:10.1080/00036846.2011.595690 
Graham, J. R. (2000). How big are the tax benefits of debt? Journal of Finance, 55(5), 1901–1941. 
Harris, M., & Raviv, A. (1991). The Theory of Capital Structure. The Journal of Finance, 46(1), 297–355. 
Jaggi, B., & Gul, F. A. (1999). An Analysis of Joint Effects of Investment Opportunity Set , Free Cash Flows and 
Size on Corporate Debt Policy. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 12(4), 371–381. 
Jensen, M. (1986). Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers. American Economic 
Review, 76(2), 323–329. 
Jensen, M., & Meckling, W. (1976). Theory of the firm, managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 3(1), 30–60. 
Jermias, J. (2008). The relative influence of competitive intensity and business strategy on the relationship between 
financial leverage and performance. The British Accounting Review, 40, 71–86. 
doi:10.1016/j.bar.2007.11.001 
Kim, W. S., & Sorensen. (1986). Evidence on the impact of the agency costs of debt on corporate debt policy. 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 21(2), 131–144. 
Lemmon, & Zender. (2001). Looking under the lamppost: An empirical examination of the determinants of capital 
structure (No. 2192502). Retrieved from http://leeds-
faculty.colorado.edu/Zender/papers/LZjun_07_01.pdf 
McConnell, J., & Servaes, H. (1995). Equity Ownership and the Two Faces of Debt. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 39(1), 131–157. 
Journal of Poverty, Investment and Development                                                                                                                             www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2422-846X     An International Peer-reviewed Journal 
Vol.23, 2016 
 
62 
Modigliani, F., & Miller, M. (1958). The cost of capital, corporate finance and the theory of investment. American 
Economic Review, 48(1), 261–297. 
Myers, & Majluf, N. (1984). Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that 
investors do not have. Journal of Financial Economics, 13(1), 187–221. 
Myers, S. C. (1984). The Capital Structure Puzzle. The Journal of Finance, 39(3), 575–592. doi:10.2307/2327916 
O’Brien, J. (2003). The capital structure implication of pursuing a strategy of innovation. Strategic Management 
Journal, 24(2), 415–431. 
Ozenbas, D., & Portes, L.-S.-V. (2011). Does Firm Size Matter? The Relationship between Firm Level Volatility, 
GDP Volatility and Capital Structure Decisions for Firms of Different Size Groups. The Business Review, 
17(2), 35–41. 
Raza, H., Aslam, S., & Farooq, U. (2013). Financing Pattern in Developing Nations Empirical Evidence from 
Pakistan. World Applied Sciences Journal, 22(9), 1279–1285. doi:10.5829/idosi.wasj.2013.22.09.40 
Shihua, W., & Jianhua, L. (2010). Notice of Retraction Firm Size and Capital Structure Choice. International 
Conference on E-Business and E-Government, 4051–4056. doi:10.1109/ICEE.2010.1017 
Simerly, R., & Li, M. (2000). Environmental dynamism, financial leverage and performance: a theoretical 
integration and an empirical test. Strategic Management Journal, 21(1), 31–49. 
Stretcher, R., & Johnson, S. (2011). Capital structure: professional management guidance. Managerial Finance, 
37(8), 788–804. doi:10.1108/03074351111146229 
Torres-Reyna, O. (2007). Panel data analysis fixed and random effects using Stata (v. 4.2). Retrieved from 
http://www.demonish.com/cracker/1426308968_fc8b5f133d/panel101.pdf 
Voulgaris, F., Asteriou, D., & Agiomirgianakis, G. (2004). Size and Determinants of Capital Structure in the Greek 
Manufacturing Sector. International Review of Applied Economics, 18(2), 247–262. 
doi:10.1080/0269217042000186714 
Zeitun, R., & Tian, G. G. (2007). Capital structure and corporate performance : evidence from Jordan. Australasian 
Accounting Business and Finance Journal, 1(4), 40–61. 
 
 
